Iraq as a Transition Economy by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2004
Iraq as a Transition Economy
Looney, Robert
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38464
  as a 
Transition
Economy
The Milken Institute Review14
Iraq
By Robert Looney
ith order yet to be re-established in Iraq as these words 
are being written, any appraisal of its postwar econom-
ic prospects may seem premature. But it is important 
to begin asking how best to reconstruct the Iraqi econ-
omy – if only because broad-based economic development is one 
prerequisite to the creation and maintenance of a civil society. 
By no coincidence, much of the initial address to the nation 
by the interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, focused on econom-
ic issues. Allawi, a Baathist who served in the Iraqi intelligence 
services until falling out with the regime in 1971, cited infl ation, 
unemployment and weak purchasing power as the main econom-
ic problems facing the country. While he offered no specifi cs for 
addressing these issues, he did make the case that, a year after the 
fall of Baghdad, security and economic progress were inextrica-
bly linked. The key reason that Iraqi support for suppressing the 
insurgency that followed the invasion has been modest has been 
resentment over poverty and lack of jobs.
Many of the most pressing economic decisions touch on the 
temptation to resort to interventionist policies in an economy 
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currently lacking the infrastructure to sup-
port competitive markets. Washington would 
plainly prefer that Iraq opt for restraint, in 
part because free markets are more likely 
to deliver the goods in the long run and 
in part because Baathist-style intervention 
would undermine the prospects for democ-
racy and political pluralism. A third plausible 
option, the establishment of a Saudi-style, 
oil-dominated economy in which stability is 
maintained by paying off disaffected interest 
groups, would hardly be likely to evolve into 
a prosperous, viable democracy. 
the economic legacy of the 
coalition provisional authority
In the fall of 2003 with Iraq in ruins, the 
American-led Coalition Provisional Author-
ity imposed a series of reforms reminiscent of 
the shock therapy attempted in the 1990s in 
most of the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Overnight, Iraq became 
the most open economy in the Arab world. “If 
carried through,” The Economist concluded, 
“the measures will represent the kind of wish 
list that foreign investors and donor agencies 
dream of for developing markets.” Five provi-
sions were key:
• With the exception of oil production and 
refi ning, foreigners are allowed 100 percent 
ownership of Iraqi assets, full repatriation 
of profi ts, and legal standing equal to  local 
fi rms. 
• Foreign banks are welcome to establish 
operations immediately, or to purchase 
equity in existing Iraqi fi nancial institu-
tions. 
• Income and corporate taxes are capped at 
15 percent.
• Import tariffs are reduced to a fl at 5 per-
cent, with no duties at all imposed on 
food, drugs, books and other humanitarian 
imports. 
• With the exception of oil, Iraq’s state-owned 
enterprises are to be privatized (though at a 
time and by a method not specifi ed).
The Coalition’s reforms were comple-
mented by a series of measures designed to 
strengthen institutions needed in a free-mar-
ket economy. Most important were the bank-
ing initiatives. Order Number 40 defi ned the 
rules establishing and governing a new Iraqi 
banking system based on the Western model. 
It gives the Central Bank of Iraq full legal and 
operational authority over the payments sys-
tem. More important, it gives private banks 
broad discretion to serve as fi nancial interme-
diaries, with none of the limitations imposed 
by fundamentalist Islamic interpretations of 
lending practices. 
In addition, a new Iraqi dinar was intro-
duced, with the central bank given indepen-
dence in its pursuit of stable monetary and 
exchange-rate policy. While many experts 
recommended a fi xed exchange rate (or even 
a “currency board” arrangement that locked 
the value of the dinar to major foreign cur-
rencies), the central bank opted for a man-
aged fl oating-rate regime. 
The management mechanism is relative-
ly simple. The central bank exchanges dol-
lars for dinars in a daily auction. It can sell 
dinars if it deems the local currency too dear, 
or it can buy them if the dinar depreciates. By 
mid-2004, the central bank had intervened in 
this manner on several occasions to curtail 
speculator-driven appreciation. 
With the reduction of tariffs to levels that 
raise some much-needed revenue without 
signifi cantly protecting domestic producers, 
Iraqi producers and consumers face world 
price levels. This exposure has already forced 
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painful adjustments in employment, wages 
and prices. What’s more, the shock is likely to 
be reinforced by the recovery of oil produc-
tion and the expenditure of foreign donor 
funds. Both will increase the quantity of for-
eign exchange in the hands of Iraqis, putting 
upward pressure on the exchange value of the 
dinar and raising the likelihood that domes-
tic goods other than oil will be priced out of 
world markets. 
The overvaluation of a currency linked to 
booming exports of raw materials – dubbed 
“Dutch disease” because of the econom-
ic damage suffered by the Netherlands after 
the discovery of vast quantities of natural 
gas – is not a trivial problem. Indeed, it part-
ly explains the relatively poor long-term per-
formance of a host of economies that seem-
ingly had the advantage of generous export 
earnings. 
The main advantage of the dinar’s man-
aged fl oat is that adjustments to compen-
sate for the effects of changing oil prices 
can be made in the exchange rate, rather 
than in wages and prices. However, this will 
not cure Dutch disease if the country is also 
prone to infl ation. Faced with a similar sit-
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stabilization funds to “sterilize” export rev-
enues. These accounts segregate part of the 
foreign currency earned from oil sales in a 
centrally managed fund, thereby reducing 
upward pressure on the local currency. The 
idea is to accumulate cash in good times and 
deplete it in bad times, providing a stable 
balance-of-payments environment. 
Thus, if current plans go forward, Iraq will 
develop as a highly open economy. It will also 
have many of the modern fi nancial institu-
tions needed to operate in the world environ-
ment. Economic theory suggests that an open 
economy with modern fi nancial institutions 
would be best served by a combination of a 
managed fl oating exchange rate and an oil-
stabilization fund. But while the former is in 
place, the latter is not. 
The establishment of enforceable, well-
defi ned property rights, needed to underpin 
free markets, has also been neglected. Perhaps 
the Coalition Authority intended to defer cre-
ation of the legal architecture to an elected 
Iraqi government. But unless the interim gov-
ernment and its elected successors do com-
plete the reform, most Iraqis will continue to 
experience a darker sort of free-market capi-
talism in which might makes right. 
the coalition provisional 
authority reforms in practice
The economic-policy challenges facing the 
new government are daunting. Among the 
most immediate: creating jobs for millions of 
dislocated workers, establishing a social safety 
net, rehabilitating agriculture, guaranteeing 
stable food supplies – and, of course, funding 
all these tasks without triggering unaccept-
More than half the state-owned companies 
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able rates of infl ation.
Anecdotal accounts suggest that the Coali-
tion Authority drew up the shock-therapy 
program with minimal Iraqi consultation. 
Iraqis, no doubt,  will be able to exercise some 
control over the details of implementation. 
However, undertaking a full-scale shift in 
development strategy makes little sense until 
an elected government is in place. Perhaps 
for this reason, the interim government has 
shown little inclination to deviate from the 
path laid out by the Coalition Authority.
Arguably the biggest risk associated with 
this rigidity is that Iraqi governments will 
not be able to pursue the fi scal policies neces-
sary to revitalize the economy. As noted, the 
highest income tax bracket is set at 15 per-
cent. Other constraints on the government’s 
fi nances involve treatment of past govern-
ment domestic debt and limits on offi cial 
borrowing from the central bank. In June 
the Coalition Authority’s administrator, Paul 
Bremer, signed the Public Debt Law, requir-
ing the Iraqi government to honor all domes-
tic debts to Iraq’s commercial banks – debts 
largely contracted by Saddam Hussein. This 
paper is estimated to be around 1.3 trillion 
dinars (more than $1 billion). The Public 
Debt Law, therefore, can be seen as a way to 
recapitalize Iraq’s private banks, which would 
otherwise face insolvency. 
The central bank also holds about $2.5 
billion in Iraqi government debt. Under the 
Bond Market Plan put together by the Coali-
tion Authority, this debt must be paid as it 
matures. However, because the central bank 
is now formally independent, the govern-
ment cannot force the bank to buy govern-
ment debt (as Hussein did). 
It should be no surprise, then, that the 
interim government is attempting to devel-
op a domestic bond market as an addition-
al source of fi nance. In July, the central bank 
raised about 150 billion dinars (then, $103 
million) by selling debt due in three months. 
The bonds paid interest of between 5 and 8 
percent – not enough to entice foreign partic-
ipation in light of the risks involved. Instead, 
the vast majority of buyers were local banks. 
The short maturity of the bonds was 
designed to allow the government to prove 
its creditworthiness to a skeptical market. 
Baghdad plans to issue six-month and one-
year bonds later on, hoping to raise as much 
as $1.2 billion by the end of the year. One 
ancillary benefi t: the development of a gov-
ernment debt market will introduce anoth-
er constraint on the government – if it over-
spends the way Hussein did, investors will 
demand higher interest rates. 
In a related move, the interim government 
began implementing a Coalition Authori-
ty initiated revamp of the Baghdad Stock 
Exchange. The new Iraq Stock Exchange, 
which opened in June, is the product of more 
than a year’s work by the 12 brokerage fi rms 
and banks that jointly own it. And, at least 
on paper, it is buttressed by a strong regula-
tory framework stressing transparency and 
accountability. At the proverbial opening bell, 
the exchange listed 27 companies; a total of 
180 to 200 are expected by the end of the year. 
The tea leaves offer positive signs: in fi ve ses-
sions, trading volume nearly quadrupled and 
the value of stocks surged. 
While the old stock exchange contained 
only Iraqi companies and traders, the new 
one will eventually be accessible to foreigners. 
The exchange plans to shift to an electronic 
trading system in the near future. With luck, 
the stock market will begin to lure money 
from Iraqis living overseas.
While it is too early to make fi rm judg-
ments, the Coalition Authority’s program’s 
fi scal and monetary aspects do not appear to 
place impediments on the Iraqis other than 
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those found in any sound fi nancial system. 
The rules and institutions simply represent 
the steps responsible governments must take 
to lay the foundation for sustainable growth. 
The Authority’s enthusiasm for privatiza-
tion is more controversial. U.S. offi cials see 
privatization as part of a broader conserva-
tive economic agenda. The state still con-
trols almost all large businesses; the 61 major 
industries under the Ministry of Industry 
and Minerals account for 90 percent of Iraq’s 
industrial production, including oil, leather 
goods and textiles. When the interim govern-
ment assumed power, most state enterprises 
were in dire straits, with only the oil and 
cement industries showing a profi t. State-run 
enterprises brought in the equivalent of $73 
million in revenue in the fi rst fi ve months 
of 2004, but paid out $85 million in salaries 
alone – much of it to the two-thirds of their 
employees who were not working. More than 
half the state-owned companies are not oper-
ating at all, and the rest are functioning at a 
fraction of capacity. 
On fi rst glance, privatization would appear 
to be a plausible start to solving the underuti-
lization problem; private enterprises subject 
to market forces are generally more effi cient. 
Moreover, the sale of the state enterprises 
would both generate needed revenues for the 
government and relieve it of the ongoing 
drain of subsidies to the losers. 
A closer look, however, suggests that the 
diffi culties owners would face are likely to 
dampen interest in the transition for some 
time. The State Company for Woolen Indus-
tries provides a useful illustration. The com-
pany has power generators, which can keep 
machinery moving even when Baghdad’s 
electricity supply is down. Nonetheless, its 
fi ve functioning plants are running only one 
shift out of three. And while the 3,700 work-
ers are putting in far less than a full 
week on the job, they are still being 
paid full salaries. 
One major source of the fi rm’s dif-
fi culties is the Coalition Authority’s 
arbitrary doubling of worker salaries 
after it took over in April 2003 – a 
move to reduce political unrest. That 
huge increase in operating costs makes 
the company’s woolen blankets, tents 
and clothing much more expensive 
than imports, which are now enter-
ing the country essentially duty-free 
as a result of the decision to slash tar-
iffs. Compounding the problem, fac-
tory suppliers refuse to deliver materials over 
Iraq’s bandit-ridden roads. 
The bottom line: privatization is a non-
starter, at least for the moment. Uncertainty 
over security makes it impossible to arrive at 
fair-value bids, and the political need to keep 
underemployed workers on the job makes 
restructuring highly problematic. 
the spectre of unemployment
The U.S.-sponsored reforms have come under 
intense criticism both inside and outside Iraq. 
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their most immediate consequence – unem-
ployment. 
After the fall of Hussein’s government, 
Ambassador Bremer and the Governing 
Council decreed that the top three levels of 
the Baath party membership could not be on 
the government payroll. Estimates vary, but a 
safe guess is that more than 120,000 people 
lost their jobs. Some were diehard Saddam 
loyalists. But many were doctors, nurses, uni-
versity professors and other professionals 
who probably joined the Baath Party just to 
get jobs or to advance their careers. Not only 
were their productive services lost, but their 
foregone wages also had a familiar negative 
multiplier effect on aggregate demand for 
consumer goods. Only in April of this year, 
after much of the damage was done, did 
Ambassador Bremer reverse the wholesale de-
Baathifi cation policy and make many laid-off 
Baathist teachers eligible for jobs.
Employment also fell after the war because 
of the Coalition Authority’s decision to dis-
band the army, which consisted of about 
7 percent of the labor force. The coalition 
would later pay stipends to former soldiers, 
but the decision to put soldiers back on the 
streets without jobs has been blamed for 
much of the increase in violent resistance to 
the occupation. 
In addition, delays in reconstruction have 
taken a toll on employment. Seven months 
after Congress approved an $18.4 billion aid 
package for Iraq, less than 5 percent had been 
spent. By late May of this year, the pace of 
expenditure appeared to be picking up. How-
ever, by then, the damage to Iraqi goodwill 
caused by unaddressed unemployment was 
all too apparent. 
Reconstruction contracting has also played 
a part in slowing the pace of job creation. In 
principle, the system for disbursing the $18 
The damage to Iraqi goodwill caused by unaddressed
     unemployment 
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billion should give Iraqi companies a boost. 
They were given priority in subcontracting, 
although fi rms from the 69 coalition coun-
tries could also bid. However, Iraqi compa-
nies suffered in competing with foreign fi rms 
because they have inadequate working capi-
tal and could not obtain fi nancing from the 
country’s nascent banking system.
As a result, reconstruction projects are 
not putting much money into the hands of 
Iraqi entrepreneurs. By May 2004, fewer than 
25,000 Iraqis were working on projects fund-
ed by the United States, a tiny fraction of the 
original projections.
As noted above, most Iraqi companies 
are not able to win reconstruction contracts 
because they lack access to credit. Yet most 
development experts agree that the success 
of midsize businesses in creating new jobs is 
critical for stability. Again, delays in restoring 
the country’s banking system are severely lim-
iting the pace of economic recovery.
In sum, Iraq’s current economic malaise 
has its origins in a series of miscalculations 
by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Too 
many decisions were made without examin-
ing the economic dimension. Once unem-
ployment got out of control, violence and 
insurgency increased, the economy suffered, 
and aid fl ows dried up due to the lack of safe-
ty, creating a vicious cycle that the belated 
reforms could not correct. 
peering into the future
The interim government seems committed 
to staying the course, hoping that, with a 
number of new construction projects coming 
online, unemployment will be brought under 
control – and, with it, the insurgency. One 
hopes improved security will bring more cap-
ital from abroad, stimulating reconstruction 
and job creation. Accordingly, it is possible 
that growth and reform will fi t into a virtuous 
circle, just as they did in the successful transi-
tion economies in Eastern Europe.
None of this will happen, however, unless 
Iraq gets the breathing room to shift from 
an expenditures/reconstruction mindset to a 
reform/development/growth orientation. 
Past experience suggests that for oil-based 
economies like Iraq’s, increased efforts in 
four areas appear critical: rule of law, voice 
and accountability, banking and fi nance, and 
foreign investment. Interestingly, the most 
important are the fi rst two, which fall under 
the rubric of governance. 
Of course, sustaining reform is a daunting 
task. As in other transition economies, reform 
can take Iraq in one of two directions. Some 
countries, including Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, have experienced a sustained eco-
nomic revival and have even met the condi-
tions for membership in the European Union. 
By contrast, some transition economies – for 
example, Moldova, are still struggling to dereg-
ulate prices, establish institutions to support 
competitive markets, rationalize the reach of 
government and impose effective rule of law. 
Why have some countries succeeded while 
others failed? Recent research links the fail-
ures to the strength of interest groups that 
benefi t fi nancially from the status quo. One 
can already see these groups forming in Iraq 
– for example, among workers in the state 
enterprises, whose jobs often amount to sine-
cures. Note, too, that many Iraqis who are 
receiving subsidized gasoline, food and the 
like can profi t by selling these goods on the 
black market. The more chance these groups 
have to tighten their grip on the middle levels 
of power, the greater the obstacle they present 
to Iraqi advancement. 
To offset the infl uence of these groups, 
Iraqi reformers will have to create their own 
winners – groups with a vested interest in the 
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success of the reforms. In Eastern Europe, 
these groups have often been workers and 
entrepreneurs associated with new small- 
and medium-sized businesses. And it is in 
just these categories that most of the new 
jobs will have to be created in Iraq. Thus, one 
of Iraq’s top economic priorities should be 
improving the infrastructure that supports 
these businesses – everything from depend-
able telecommunications to an effi cient bank-
ing system. 
Although the Coalition Authority reforms 
do not appear to be a major impediment to 
the economy’s recovery, they are unlikely to 
perform miracles by themselves. Eventual-
ly, Iraqis will have to implement a develop-
ment strategy that reduces dependence on oil. 
While the current low-tariff policy is useful in 
allowing a clearer identifi cation of the coun-
try’s comparative advantage outside the ener-
gy sector, a good case can be made for tem-
porary import protection to nurture infant 
industries. In addition, the tax system will 
have to be revamped so that the authorities 
are better able to shift resources in desired 
directions and, in the absence of an oil fund, 
to offset oil price fl uctuations. 
Finding ways to solve technocratic prob-
lems is easier than fi nding the will. The great-
est challenge facing Iraq’s transition to a sta-
ble free-market democracy will be sustaining 
support for reform. For, as Ronald Rotun-
da, the George Mason University Founda-
tion professor of law, observed, “It seems that 
many Iraqis do not understand … why a mar-
ket economy can make the poor people much 
better off than they ever were when Saddam 
controlled the oil wealth and doled out perks 
to the Iraqis like a stern parent rewards small 
children for being seen and not heard.” 
         A good case can be made 
      for temporary import protection to 
             nurture infant industries. 
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